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Why	the	EU	should	work	with	opposition	parties	to
avoid	democratic	backsliding
Policymakers	and	scholars	of	the	European	Union	have	been	increasingly	more	concerned	about	democratic
backsliding	in	member	countries	where	the	EU	no	longer	possesses	the	‘membership’	carrot	for	continued	reforms.
But	is	the	EU	really	hopeless	when	it	comes	to	helping	members	safeguard	and	promote	good	governance?	Mert
Kartal	presents	findings	from	a	recent	study	which	suggest	that	the	EU	can	make	a	difference	by	convincing	and/or
empowering	opposition	parties	in	member	countries	to	uphold	good	governance.
In	the	aftermath	of	the	Cold	War,	the	EU’s	efforts	to	democratise	post-communist	countries	in	Central	and	Eastern
Europe	have	attracted	considerable	attention.	Among	a	few	alternatives,	membership	conditionality	has	been	the
most	popular	explanation	for	the	successful	reforms	many	EU-applicant	countries	in	the	region	achieved	in	the	late
1990s	and	early	2000s.	More	specifically,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	EU	helped	promote	good	governance	in
these	countries	because	it	was	able	to	grant	them	membership	in	return	for	reforms.
This	incentive-based	conditionality	argument	has	also	been	used	to	shed	light	on	the	substantial	policy	reversals
(e.g.,	in	corruption	control	or	in	minority	protection)	that	several	members	have	suffered	from	since	the	mid-2000s.
More	specifically,	scholars	have	long	argued	that	because	the	credible	membership	incentive	ceased	to	exist	after
accession,	national	governments	(at	least	in	some	member	countries	like	Bulgaria	and	Romania)	moved	away	from
prioritising	EU-induced	policies	and	subsequently	abandoned	governance	reforms.
Obviously,	the	mere	possibility	of	such	illiberal	tendencies	in	itself	is	bad	news.	Besides,	it	implies	that	the	EU
hardly	possesses	any	effective	tool	to	prevent	policy	reversals	in	member	countries.	What	is	even	more	troubling	is
that,	as	we	have	recently	found	out,	backsliding	in	good	governance	has	not	been	limited	to	only	a	few	countries	in
Central	and	Eastern	Europe;	instead,	there	seems	to	be	an	alarming	trend	in	most	new	members	of	the	EU.
In	a	recent	study,	I	found	that	although	EU-member	countries	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	in	general	have
suffered	from	policy	reversals	in	corruption	control,	there	has	been	no	such	deterioration	regarding	ethnic	minority
rights.	While	increasing	corruption	is	certainly	concerning,	my	findings	in	the	case	of	minority	protection	suggest	a
rather	optimistic	scenario:	It	may	actually	be	possible	for	the	EU	to	help	member	countries	uphold	good	governance
even	in	the	post-accession	period.	To	account	for	this	possibility,	we	need	to	understand	what	the	EU	has	been
missing	in	the	case	of	corruption	control	but	not	in	minority	protection.
Accordingly,	I	analysed	the	conditions	under	which	the	EU	promotes	good	governance	in	its	applicant	and	member
countries	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	My	analyses	suggested	that	the	EU’s	ability	to	‘recruit’	opposition	parties
in	national	legislatures	to	prioritise	good	governance	in	their	agendas	is	key	to	understanding	the	trajectory	of
governance	reforms	in	the	region.	I	found	that	such	political	leverage	of	the	EU	over	member	countries	serves	as	a
better	predictor	of	country	performance	than	any	other	alternative	including	membership	conditionality.
In	the	1990s,	there	was	high	public	support	for	the	EU	in	many	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries.	This	was
mostly	because	the	public	believed	that	EU	membership	would	grant	them	a	higher	standard	of	living.	However,	EU
membership	was	an	exclusive	perk	for	which	any	interested	country	would	have	to	implement	a	set	of
requirements.	Moreover,	executing	governance	reforms	(e.g.,	anti-corruption,	non-discrimination)	in	line	with	the
EU’s	demands	was	considerably	costly	for	governments	in	most	post-communist	countries	due	to	their	economic,
political,	and	cultural	legacies	from	the	Soviet	years.
Importantly,	when	a	government	in	an	EU-candidate	country	failed	to	implement	these	reforms,	it	was	publicly
criticised	by	the	EU.	Such	criticism	coming	from	an	external	actor	that	was	popular	among	the	public	had	a	few
serious	consequences.	First,	it	hurt	government	parties’	reputation	among	voters	and,	hence,	jeopardised	their
prospects	for	re-election.	Second,	it	provided	opposition	parties	with	an	opportunity	to	maximise	their	vote	share	by
moving	closer	to	policy	preferences	promoted	by	the	EU,	which	in	return	pressured	government	parties	for
governance	reforms.
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In	various	analyses,	I	found	such	ability	of	the	EU	to	recruit	opposition	parties	to	be	the	only	meaningful	predictor	of
the	positive	change	the	EU-candidate	countries	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	achieved	in	corruption	control.	This
was	the	case	even	when	membership	conditionality	was	controlled	for.	Following	accession,	however,	public
support	for	the	EU	decreased	substantively,	and	hence,	opposition	parties	dropped	their	pro-EU	rhetoric.	This
significantly	reduced	the	EU’s	political	leverage	over	governments	and	subsequently	deteriorated	their	anti-
corruption	performance.
It	is	important	to	note	that,	unlike	membership	conditionality,	the	aforementioned	political	leverage	argument	does
not	limit	the	EU’s	ability	to	influence	domestic	politics	to	pre-accession	years	only.	Instead,	as	long	as	it	provides
opposition	parties	with	electoral	incentives/opportunities,	the	EU	should	be	able	to	maintain	its	political	leverage
even	in	member	countries.
A	closer	analysis	of	ethnic	minority	reforms	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	supports	this	expectation.	As	a	pre-
requisite	of	membership,	the	EU	requires	applicant	countries	to	ensure	a	fairer	representation	of	minorities.	In	the
late	1990s	and	early	2000s,	this	requirement	empowered	pro-minority	political	parties	in	Central	and	Eastern
European	states.	That	is,	the	EU	made	it	more	likely	for	these	political	actors	to	influence	decision-making	and	push
for	pro-minority	reforms.	My	analyses	found	the	EU’s	ability	to	empower	opposition	parties	with	a	pro-minority
agenda	to	be	a	significant	determinant	of	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries’	success	in	promoting	minority
rights	during	the	candidacy	period.	Moreover,	even	after	accession,	opposition	parties	with	pro-minority	preferences
(e.g.,	the	UDMR	in	Romania,	the	DPS	in	Bulgaria,	the	SMK	in	Slovakia,	the	EVP	in	Estonia)	continued	pushing	for
reforms.	As	a	result,	the	political	pressure	created	by	the	EU-empowered	opposition	on	governments	to	implement
non-discrimination	reforms	maintained	its	substantial	impact	on	Central	and	Eastern	European	countries’	success	in
minority	protection	even	after	these	countries	joined	the	EU.
These	findings	have	several	important	implications.	First,	there	is	now	systematic	evidence	suggesting	that	most
EU-member	countries	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	have	experienced	policy	reversals	with	respect	to	corruption
control	since	the	mid-2000s.	Second,	the	EU’s	membership	incentive	has	not	been	able	to	promote	sustainable
governance	reforms	in	the	region.	However,	the	EU	may	still	be	able	to	encourage	good	governance	both	in
applicant	and	in	member	countries	by	collaborating	with	opposition	parties	in	national	legislatures.	One	way	for	the
EU	to	lure	opposition	parties	into	collaboration	is	to	increase	its	own	popularity	among	the	electorate.	The	more
popular	the	EU	is,	the	more	electoral	incentives	it	is	able	to	offer	to	political	parties	in	opposition	to	maximise	their
vote	share.	The	more	opposition	parties	adopt	EU-induced	policy	preferences,	the	more	effectively	the	EU	pushes
governments	for	continued	reforms.
For	more	information,	see	the	author’s	accompanying	paper	in	Comparative	European	Politics
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